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FOREWORD
HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW IN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
Hon. John M. Walker, Jr.'
INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of harmless error is one of the most important doctrines in appellate decision making. Harmless error
principles are employed in reviewing errors of all types, from
improperly admitted evidence to serious constitutional errors.'
It is quite possible that these principles determine the outcome
of more criminal appeals than any other doctrine, 2 and recent
Second Circuit cases make clear the central place of harmless
error review in deciding an appeal.'
John M Walker, Jr. All Rights Reserved.
Judge John M. Walker Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. The assistance of Benjamin A. Powell and Graham Phillips in the
preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged.
' See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 717 (2d Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., concurring) (Van Graafeland, J., dissenting).
01997

2

See 2 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF

REVIEW § 7.01 (2d ed. 1986); cf. Peck v. United States, 102 F.3d 1319, 1327 (2d
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) ("[alssessment of harmlessness is
probably the single most recurring issue presented in [habeas corpus challenges to
state court convictions]").
' See, e.g., United States v. Knoll, 116 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 1997); Peck v. United
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Despite its pervasive presence, the appropriate methods
for determining whether an error is harmless are still evolving,
and are not without controversy.4 Indeed, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals convened a rare en banc hearing in the August 1996 term to determine the harmless error analysis applicable on collateral review of an error in a jury instruction defining an offense.5 Although the precise question presented to
the court was ultimately determined by the Supreme Court
prior to its decision,' Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman wrote a
separate concurrence to the resulting per curiam opinion pointing out the difficulties created by the lack of clarity in harmless error review of erroneous jury instructions. He explicitly
requested that the Supreme Court articulate the proper method for determining when erroneous jury instructions are harmless.'
This brief foreword is not the place to canvass the formulations and application of harmless error review in all contexts.'
However, it is useful to point out recent cases that are indica-

' See, e.g, Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (Scalia, J., concurring); ROGER J.
TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Harry T. Edwards, To Err is

Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error be Tolerated?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1996); James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v.
Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1994).
Controversy in the Second Circuit over the proper standard for determining
when an error is harmless is not new. Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank
engaged in a spirited dialogue over the proper standard for determining if an
error at a criminal trial is harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006
(2d Cir. 1943).
Peck, 102 F.3d 1319 (2d. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
See California v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996) (per curiam).
7 Peck, 102 F.3d at 1327. The Second Circuit was not alone in struggling with
determining the proper harmless error analysis applicable to erroneous jury instructions. The Ninth Circuit convened two en bane hearings in 1996 to grapple
with the issue. See Roy v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), judgment
vacated by California v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996) (per curiam); United States v.
Keys, 95 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1996) judgment vacated by 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996). The
Supreme Court vacated both decisions; however, even after the Court issued a
decision in Roy and remanded, the en banc court found substantial uncertainty as
to the correct mode of analysis in the Supreme Court's decision and ultimately
decided that error in the jury instructions was harmless by only a one vote majority. Roy v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 242 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied Roy v. Maddock,
118 S. Ct. 196 (1997).
' See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52; FED. R. EVID. 103;
FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
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rive of harmless error review in criminal appeals in the Second
Circuit, as well as to highlight some areas of uncertainty.
The quandary of harmless error review is that the reviewing court may not decide how it thinks the case should have
been decided, absent the error, lest the defendant be deprived
of her right to have a jury decide the issue. The appellate court
must necessarily speculate as to what a jury would have found
absent the error. However, once a judge considers the entire
record, "[the] judge faces the risk of being influenced by that
evidence" since "it is hard for a judge to discount a strong
feeling that the defendant is guilty."' Consequently, although
a jury is "uniquely situated by virtue of its very representation
of the conscience of the community ...to keep the community
and its laws in reasonable harmony," its purpose may be nullified by harmless error review."0 This creates a risk to the
rights of individuals, both constitutional and non-constitutional, as appellate courts take a more guilt-based approach to
reviewing errors." Conversely, strict appellate reversal for
error "encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and
bestirs the public to ridicule it."' Appellate courts need to
maintain an appropriate balance so that they may "cleanse the
judicial process of prejudicial error without becoming mired in
harmless error."'3
After a brief review of the harmless error doctrine, this
foreword will discuss recent developments affecting the heretofore clear, but now more opaque, principle that if an error is
"trial error" it is subject to harmless error review, but if it is
"structural error" it is not. In conclusion, I will suggest that in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v.

Edwards, supra note 4, at 1205.
,' TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 32. However, Judge Traynor argued in his seminal essay on harmless error that appellate review of the evidence to determine if
the error is harmless does not invade the province of the jury. According to
Traynor, "[i]f
the court is convinced upon review of the evidence that the error did
not influence the jury, and hence sustains the verdict, a fortiori there is no invasion of the province of the jury." If an appellate court determines that the error
did influence the jury and affected the verdict, then the defendant's right to have
a jury trial is violated and a new trial is mandated, a decision clearly within the
province of an appeals court. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 13.
" TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 32.
12 TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 50.
'3 TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 81.
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United States 4 somewhat muddying the waters of harmless
error analysis, the Supreme Court should consider revisiting
certain open issues to clarify such review of future cases.
I. BACKGROUND
Harmless error review by appellate courts is one of the
revolutionary features of modern legal jurisprudence."6 Prior
to the enactment of statutes and rules mandating harmless
error review, American appellate courts, following the English
practice, applied mechanical rules that reversed judgments no
matter how trivial the error. This practice was based on the
notion that the appellate court had no authority to weigh evidence or review the record to determine if an error was harmless. Dissatisfaction with appellate courts that "tower above
the trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of technicality" led to the enactment of statutes preventing reversals
when a defendant received a fair trial." The purpose of reforming the system to permit harmless error review was clear:
[T substitute judgment for automatic application of rules; to preserve review as a check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in trials, but at the same time to make the process perform
that function without giving men fairly convicted the multiplicity of
loopholes which any highly rigid and minutely detailed scheme of

errors, especially in relation to procedure, will engender and reflect
in a printed record."

Such harmless error review is now firmly embedded in
appellate decisionmaking. Courts frequently invoke the maxim
that "[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one" to note that it is no longer sufficient to discover errors in
the printed record to obtain a reversal. 8 Instead, with very
limited exceptions, 9 the error must have possibly affected the

14

117 S. Ct. 544 (1997).

TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 14; 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 2,
§ 7.03 at 6 ("Harmless error is probably the most far-reaching doctrinal change in
15 See

American procedural jurisprudence since its inception.").
" Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (citing Marcus A.
Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)).
"
"
'9

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760.
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
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outcome of the trial before an appeals court will reverse a
conviction.
Harmless error review in criminal appeals is mandated by
the United States Code" and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
lays out the basic framework governing harmless error review:
Rule 52. Harmless Error and Plain Error
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which

does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.e '

Rule 52(a) governs the review of error where a defendant has
made a timely objection to an error in the trial court.' The
standard for determining if a non-constitutional error is harmless on direct review is whether the error "had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."' If a judge "has 'grave doubt' about whether an error
affected a jury in this way, the judge must treat the error as if
it did so."'
If the error is a constitutional error, the degree of certainty required on direct review before a court can declare it harmless is heightened. The Supreme Court held in Chapman v.
California' that if such an error is to be deemed harmless
"the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.' Irrespective of whether the error is constitutional or non-constitutional, on direct review the
government bears the burden of showing the absence of prejudice under Rule 52(a).'
Section 2111 of Title 28 provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the sub3tantial
rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994).
20

"

FED. IMCRIM. P. 52.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

2

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776; Peck, 106 F.3d at 454; see also United States v.

21

Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Kottcahos, 328 U.S. at
765).
2

O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 438 (1995) (quoting Kotteahos, 328 U.S.

at 764-65).
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
26 Id at 24.
'

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; ONeal, 513 U.S. at 436-37.
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dice under Rule 52(a)."
Rule 52(b) governs the review of forfeited errors. The Supreme Court outlined the method for conducting plain error
review under Rule 52(b) in Olano v. United States.28 Olano set
forth a four prong test to govern an appellate court's discretion
in correcting an error not raised at trial. According to the test,
there must be: (1) an "error," (2) that is "plain," (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights," and (4) if these three conditions are
met, the court may then notice the forfeited error only if it
"seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings." 9 Under this test the defendant bears
the burden of proving that the error was not harmless. However, in the Second Circuit, if the error becomes apparent on
appeal because of a "supervening decision [after the trial
which] alters a settled rule of law in [this] circuit,... the
burden of persuasion as to prejudice (or, more precisely, lack of
prejudice) is borne by the government, and not the defendant.""
On habeas review of a constitutional error, the need for
finality, the importance of the trial itself, and concerns of comity and federalism in reviewing state court convictions led the
Supreme Court to adopt a harmless error standard less stringent than that of the Chapman test.3 Before the court can
utilize any harmless error analysis, the defendant must satisfy
the "cause and actual prejudice" standard of United States v.
Frady.3 2 Under this test, defendants must show "cause" which
would excuse their failure to appeal the error and "actual prejudice" which occurred as a result.3 3 Once a defendant can satisfy the Frady standard, a reviewing court must apply the test,
set out by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, of
whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."34 This is the same,
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 436-37.
28 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
29 Id. at 732 (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting
"

United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936))).
80 United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 835 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1327 (1997) (quoting United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir,
1994)).
"' Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-38 (1993).
32 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).
3 Id.
at 168.
",Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
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lesser standard the Court set forth in Kotteakos to be applied
on direct review of non-constitutional errors. But, if the reviewing court is in "grave doubt as to the harmlessness" of a constitutional error, 5 the petitioner wins. "Grave doubt" occurs
where "the matter is so evenly balanced that [the judge] feels
himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the er36

ror."

H. STRUCTURAL VERSUS TRIAL ERROR: THE APPLICABILITY OF
HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, 7 the first task for a court reviewing an error was to
determine if the error was a "structural" or a "trial" error.
Structural errors are fundamental defects that affect the entire
"framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself."' An error is structural
when it is of sufficient consequence that the criminal process"
'cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt .,r innocence.' " The Supreme Court has found
structural errors "only in a very limited class of cases." Examples include the total deprivation of the right to counsel and
an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction.4 ' According to the
Supreme Court, structural errors "defy analysis by 'harmless
error' standards"' and, at least prior to the Court's decision
in Johnson, the existence of structural errors "require[d] automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire

776 (1946)).
SO'Neal,
36

513 U.S. at 445 (1995).

Id. at 435.

117 S. Ct. 544 (1997).
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
"Id at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986).
Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549.
41 The Supreme Court listed six structural errors in Johnson: 1) a total deprivation of right th counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); 2) lack
of an impartial trial judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); 3) unlawful
exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986); 4) the right to self-representation at trial, see McKaslde v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168 (1984); 5) the right to a public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984); and 6) an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to a jury, see Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1549-50.
12 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 (1991)).
"
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trial process."43 If the error is not a structural error, it is a
"trial" error and subject to harmless error review.
Last term, the Second Circuit addressed the analytical approach for determining if an error was "structural." In
Yarborough v. Keane,44 a habeas petitioner claimed that his
exclusion from a robing room conference between counsel, the
judge, and a witness violated his constitutional right to be
present at material proceedings and to confront witnesses
against him. The defendant's attorney made no request that
the defendant be brought in to attend the conference and no
objection was raised in the district court.
In considering the appropriate harmless error analysis to
be applied, the panel in Yarborough elaborated on Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of structural errors in Arizona v.
Fulminante.45 The panel did not interpret Fulminante's list of
structural errors as meaning "that any violation of the same
constitutional right is a 'structural defect,' regardless of whether the error is significant or trivial."46 Instead, "[t]o determine
whether an error is properly categorized as structural," the
Yarborough panel looked "not only at the right violated, but
also at the particular nature, context, and significance of the
violation."47
In applying this approach to determine whether the exclusion from the hearing was structural, the panel found that the
proceeding was of minimal importance and that the witness
was not significant to the case. The defendant's absence from
the hearing did not "call into question the fundamental fairness of the trial" and could not fall "within Fulminante's classification of structural errors."4' Thus, the panel applied the

Brecht standard applicable on collateral review-whether the
error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict 49--to determine if the error was
harmless. In light of the insignificance of the witness's testimony and the "overwhelming" evidence of the defendant's guilt,

' Id. See infra text accompanying notes 63-74 for a discussion of Johnson.
"

101 F.3d 894 (2d Cir. 1996).

499 U.S. 570 (1986).
Id. at 897.
47 Id.
4
Id. at 898.
, Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
46
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the panel concluded that the error, if any in fact existed, was
"certainly harmless." °
In Peterson v. Williams,51 another panel considered
whether a defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial because of an inadvertent courtroom
closure for twenty minutes during his testimony. While a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was listed
in Fulminante as one of the structural errors that "defy" harmless error analysis,52 the Peterson panel did not address
whether the error was "structural." Instead, it applied a "triviality standard" of constitutional interpretation which looked to
"whether the actions of the court and the effect they had on
the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant-whether innocent or guilty-of the protections conferred by the Sixth
Amendment."'3 This standard is "very different from a harmless error inquiry" because it does not dismiss an error on the
grounds that "the defendant was guilty anyway or that he did
not suffer 'prejudice.' "s' The panel concluded that there was
no error since there was no violation of the defendant's right to
a public trial due to the short, inadvertent nature of the closure.
Peterson presents an alternative approach to Yarborough
by holding that some de minimis events are too trivial to constitute error and thus fall outside harmless error review. Yet it
may be that the differences in analytical approaches between
the two cases are insignificant in terms of the ultimate outcome. The absence of the defendant from a minor non-trial
proceeding in Yarborough, without any objection from his counsel, may not be an error under Peterson's triviality standard.
Similarly, considering its nature, context, and significance, the
inadvertent closure in Petersonwould probably not be structural error under Yarborough. The closure was "1) extremely
short, 2) followed by a helpful summation, and 3) entirely
inadvertent,"55 all factors suggesting that the error was not
"structural" under the Yarborough analysis.

5' Yarborough, 101 F.3d at 899.
51 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996).
52

"

See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42.
Id.

"Id.

at 44.
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Yarborough and Peterson both indicate that few errors are
severe enough to be classified as structural. Although there is
no reason necessarily to confine the class of structural errors to
the six specified by the Supreme Court in Fulminante, it is
unclear whether the Second Circuit recognizes any structural
errors beyond those specified. 5 In United States v. Taylor, 7
the Second Circuit agreed with the defendants' argument that
"if their right to exercise peremptory challenges has been denied or impaired, they need not show that the jury was biased
in order to obtain a new trial,""8 even though the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not a constitutional right. The
panel ultimately held that the defendants' right to exercise
peremptory challenges was not impaired and did not reach the
issue of whether a finding of impairment requires automatic
reversal even if no rational juror could have found the defendants not guilty. Thus, while it may be that a defendant does
not bear the burden of showing a biased jury, it is not clear
whether a court must reverse if there is no showing of prejudicial effect on the verdict.
In United States v. Vebeliunas,59 the panel stated that a
constructive amendment of an indictment 6 is a "per se violation[] of the [F]ifth [A]mendment that require[s] reversal even
without a showing of prejudice to the defendant."' However,
the panel clearly went on to apply harmless error review to
determine if the defendant's conviction must be reversed. The
defendant failed to object to the jury instructions challenged on
appeal and the panel reviewed for plain error under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which required that the defendant show the error prejudiced him.6 2 The panel affirmed
" See Twenty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure-Review Proceedings,
85 GEo. L.J. 1463, 1495-96 & nn.2661, 2664 (1997).
57 92 F.3d 1313, 1325 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 771 (1997).
58 Id.

at 1325 n.7.

76 F.3d 1283 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 362 (1996).
As defined by the court:

A constructive amendment occurs when the government's presentation of
evidence and the district court's jury instructions combine to 'modify the
essential elements of the offense charged to the point that there is a
substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an
offense other than the one charged by the grand jury.'
Id. at 1290 (quoting United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 1994)).
61 Id. (citing United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994)).
62 Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d at 1291.
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the defendant's convictions because, even if there were a constructive amendment of the indictment, the defendant failed to
establish prejudice under Olano.
. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson casts
doubt on the continuing vitality of the dichotomy between
structural error and trial error. A little over three months after
a Second Circuit panel stated in Peck that "a per se rule of
reversal applies when a structural error is present at trial,
even if the record contains overwhelming evidence of guilt,;
the Supreme Court held in Johnson that it did not need to
resolve whether the failure to have a jury decide if the evidence was sufficient to satisfy a necessary element of an offense was a structural error because the record contained
"overwhelming" evidence of the defendant's guilt."
In Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
failure to submit to the jury the question of the materiality of
a false statement made to the government required reversal of
a conviction. The defendant in Johnson was indicted for perjury after testifying falsely before a grand jury. At her trial, the
district court instructed the jury that the element of the materiality of her false statement was a question for the court to
decide. Subsequent to trial, but prior to appeal, the Supreme
Court decided in United States v. Gaudin' that the failure to
submit the question of materiality to the jury violated a
defendant's right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, her guilt as to each element of the charged offense.66 Johnson argued on direct appeal that the Gaudin error invalidated her conviction.
The Supreme Court rejected Johnson's argument that (1)
the error was "structural" and (2) because the error was structural, it was not subject to harmless error review. Instead, the

' See Peck, 106 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added). See also Yarborough, 101 F.3d
at 897 ("[e]rrors are properly categorized as structural only if they so fundamentally undermine the fairness or the validity of the trial that they require voiding its
result regardless of identifiable prejudice."). These Second Circuit cases merely restated what appeared to be the Supreme Court's clear rule that "[tlhe existence of
such defects-deprivation of the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), for example-requires automatic reversal of the conviction because they
infect the entire trial process." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30.
Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1546.
515 U.S. 506 (1995).
66 Id
at 522-23
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Court applied plain error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) as outlined in Olano' The Court held
that the first two prongs of Olano were satisfied because there
was (1) an "error," that was (2) "plain.""
Despite the Court's previous indications that if an error
were structural it "defied" harmless error analysis (because
without correction of the error "criminal punishment may [not]
be regarded as fundamentally fair,"69 ) the Court's discussion
of whether the Gaudin error affected any "substantial rights"
of the defendant under the third prong of Olano raises the possibility that harmless error analysis applies even in the case of
structural errors. The Court declined to decide in Johnson if
the error was a structural or a trial error. Instead, the Court
concluded that even though the error might be a structural
error, the defendant failed to satisfy the fourth prong of Olano.
The Court reasoned that because "the evidence supporting materiality was 'overwhelming,' " the error did not "seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.7 The Court's concluding paragraph illustrates its
current emphasis on examining even serious constitutional
errors for their effect on the trial verdict:
On this record there is no basis for concluding that the error "seriously affectted] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such
as this which would have that effect. "Reversal for error, regardless
of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it."7 No "miscarriage
of justice""3 will result here if we do not notice the error, and we
decline to do so."'

The Second Circuit followed Johnson's lead in United
States v. Knoll by declining to resolve whether a similar error

See supra text accompanying notes 27-35 for a discussion of Rule 52 and the
Olano test.
Johnson, 117 S.Ct. at 1569.
" Fulminate, 499 U.S. at 310 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
"' Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1550.
71 Id.
7'2 TRAYNOR, supra note 5, at
50.
71 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736
(1994).
7' United States v. Knoll, 116 F.3d 994, 999-1000 (2d. Cir. 1997) (quoting
Johnson, 117 S.Ct. at 1550).
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in a jury instruction was structural. In Knoll, the defendant
was convicted of aiding and abetting the making of a material
false statement to a federal agency in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1001 and 1002, after assisting in the preparation of a financial statement for the United States Department of Justice
which falsely stated that the person submitting the statement
did not have'a savings account. On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction based on the district court's failure to
allow the jury to decide the question of materiality. The Court
applied the Olano test and concluded that the first two prongs
were satisfied. The failure to submit materiality to the jury
was "error" and the error was "plain" at the time of our consideration of the case. However, we declined to address Olano's
third prong. Instead, as the Supreme Court did in Johnson, we
ruled that the defendant failed to satisfy the fourth prong of
Olano by showing the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." This
conclusion was based on the defendant's failure to raise a plausible argument that concealing a savings account is not a material statement when provided on a form whose express purpose is to determine the availability of assets to satisfy a criminal fine.
Johnson has blurred the principal distinction between
structural and trial errors, namely that harmless error analysis is appropriate for the latter, but not the former. It is too
early to assess the erosion of the trial error/structural error
dichotomy thus presented.
CONCLUSION

Johnson in the Supreme Court and Yarborough and Peterson in the Second Circuit illustrate how a broad principle of
law may have trouble standing the test of time-in this case,
even a relatively short period of time. In 1991, the Supreme
Court in Fulminante articulated the dichotomy between
"structural error" and "trial error" with only the latter subject
to harmless error review. Within less than a decade, the Second Circuit, troubled by the rigidity of the dichotomy, found
two different ways to hold that the type of error that the Court
had termed "structural" did not require reversal of a criminal
conviction. In Yarborough, we held that a minor deprivation of
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a defendant's right to be present at his trial was in fact not
"structural" and thus was subject to harmless error review. In
Peterson, we held that a limited inadvertent closure of a trial
to the public was not error at all, "structural" or otherwise. In
Johnson, the Supreme Court expressly reserved decision on
whether the failure to charge the jury on an element of the
offense was either a "structural" or "trial" error, but held that,
at least for unpreserved error assessed under Rule 52(b), reversal would not be required in either case in part because the
evidence supporting the missing element was "overwhelming."
Whereas Yarborough and Peterson were faithful to the
principle that structural error requires reversal, Johnson was
not. Further explanation from the Supreme Court is needed to
resolve at least two uncertainties: (1) whether a court's failure
to charge on an element of the offense is "structural error" and
(2) whether there are circumstances in which "structural error"
may be subject to harmless error review, and if so, what are
such circumstances.

